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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
.MEL VIN F. HULET,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DANIEL TULLIS and
MARILYN H. TULLIS,
his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 12615

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action by plaintiff wherein he filed a Com~
plaint seeking restitution or possession of certain real
propert)r and improvements thereon, located in Iron
Connt)\ Utah, and defendants filed Counterclaim for derrep of specific performance on an alleged oral buy and
Rale contract between the parties, the plaintiff contending
thr cas<> is within the Statute of Frauds, there being no
rontract <lne to lack of an executed document, and the
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defendants contending that the matter is without th('
Statute of Frauds, or an exception thereto, because of
their action and partial performance pursuant to the al- '
leged oral contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The District Court of Iron County, Utah, entered
Judgment on August 5, 1971, ordering that plaintiff have
restitution of the realty and improvements and further
ordering that the value of improvements made by defendants are an offset against plaintiff's claim for rent
and damages, the Court finding that there was not a
ing of the minds between the parties hence no enforceable
oral buy and sale contract.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

This Appeal is taken by defendants

asking this

Honorable Court to reverse the ruling of the Trial Court
and remand the case back to said Trial Court with a mandate to decree specific performance on the part of plaintiff for the behalf of defendants pursuant to the Counterclaim of defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prior to .July 24, 1969, plaintiff Hulet and his wife
had talked with defenclantf; TulliR on occasion abont sell-

iug to def'euuants a small lot in Newcastle, Iron County,
Utah, on which there is located a small frame home (Tr.
49, 88-89). However, negotiations had not succeeded for
either party (Tr. 49-50). Then, on July 24, 1969, at the
rodeo grounds at Enterprise, Utah, the Hulets told the
1
'1 nllis people that they could buy the property for
$5,000.00 total purchase price at $200.00 as down payment
and $100.00 per month. and further, that they, the Hulets,
would get a contract drawn by their attorney but that in
the meantime defendants could go ahead and make improvements on the premises and move in (Tr. 50, 89).
The parents of defendant Daniel Tullis were present and
heard the conversation between the Tullis people and
Hulets and so testified at the trial (Tr. 37-38, 43-44).
The oral agreement made at Enterprise, Utah on
July 24, 1969 was that Hulets would sell the home and
lot together with 42 shares of Newcastle Town Water for
the total price of $5,000.00, with $200.00 down payment
and $100.00 per month, with 8% interest on the unpaid
balance. The Hulets were to deliver a Warranty Deed
and Abstract into escrow whereupon these documents
would be delivered to the Tullis people upon full payment
of the contract. Plaintiff Hulet testified (Tr. 19-23) as
did his wife (Tr. 116) as to the total price, terms, water
and escrow provisions and that they were to obtain a
rnntrart covering- these terms.
Tlw first part of August, 1969, Tullis began making
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improvements on the borne and lot (Tr. 51-52). However,

at this time, the Hulets had not yet obtained a written
contract. During the first part of August, 1969, defendant Marilyn Tullis met Mr. Hulet at the Newcastle Post
Office. Mr. Hulet advised her that he would bring the
contract out as soon as possible (Tr. 40, 90). The Tullis
people were anxious to obtain the contract and on approximately September 1, 1969, they contacted Mrs. Hulet and
were advised by her again to go ahead and move in the
house and improve it as if it were their own and that she

would get the contract drawn and have them sign it (Tr. '
91). Included in these improvements were repairs to sew-

er, sewer line, plumbing, heating system, painting, carpeting, paneling and cement work (Tr. 63-64). Aside from
their labor beginning in August, 1969, they expended a
total sum of $1,454.00 on materials from the date of Se~- •
tember 15 to November 15, 1969 (Exhibit D-3 and Tr.
65-67). Even though no written contract of sale had been

presented or signed by the parties, the Tullis people
moved into the premises approximately November 15.
1969, being assured repeatedly by the Hulets that a lritten contract was forthcoming. At this time the improvements were completed (Tr. 52, 64, 98). After the Tullis
people had moved into the premises, Mrs. Tullis again
met Mr. Hulet at the Newcastle Post Office and inqnirrd
about a written contract. Sh<> was advised hv Mr. Hnlet
111

at that time that his wifo was "drag;i!,"ing h<>r fret" h

1
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that he would get things "straightened out" (Tr. 41).
Finally, in latter November or December, 1969, the Hulets
presented a contract drawn by their attorney, identified
as Exhibit D-1, to the Tullis people (Tr. 54, 93). However, thiH contract did not provide for the water transfer and for an escrow arrangement (Tr. 32-33, 54, 93,
116) as agreed upon by the parties. As a result of this
omission, the Tullis people did not sign the contract (Tr.
54). When the Hulets were adYised that, because of the
lack of water and escrow provisions, the Tullis people
would not execute the contract, Mr. Hulet indicated that
he would have it changed (Tr. 57). Some time thereafter,
during latter 1969, the Tullis people had their attorney,
Durham Morris, prepare an agreement which provided
for the water sale and escrow in addition to the other
terms of the agreement between the parties (Ex71ibi.f
D-2). This contract was presented by Tullis to the Hulets
(Tr. 57), and, as Mr. Hulet testified (Tr. 35), at this

time the ''deal'' was still on. In fact, the agreement the
Tullis people presented was a true restatement of their
oral arrangement (Tr. 128) but was not si '\'nerl by the
Hnlets because of their feelings toward th<> attornev who
prepared the agreement (Tr. 58, 95, 1~8). Even Mrs.
Hulet admitted the contrnct drawn hy Tullis 'R attoriwy
rontained the terms agTeed upon (Tr. 128).
Plaintiff and wif<> hoth indicated thPv had an a<r.rPemPnt with thP '1'111lis DPOfl]P to RPll thPm thP nr'lpPrtv

ti

(Tr. 16-23, 116). However, plaintiff testified that he, on

November 15, 1969, told the Tullis people that the "deal

was all off" (Tr. 7). The defendants testified this wa~ '
not so (Tr. 98). In fact, plaintiff gave conflicting testimony in that the ''deal'' was still on when he was presented with the contract drawn by Mr. l\Iorris which was

approximately December, 1969 (Exhibit D-2, Tr. 35, 37). '
From this time on, the plaintiff ignored the Tullis people
(Tr. 8, 30) even though he passed by the premises in
question four times daily in his employment (Tr. 11).

In December of 1969, defendants borrowed money to pay ,
the $200.00 down payment but never made the payment
(Tr. 59-60) due to apprehensions caused by Hulets' failure to get a written contract (Tr. 60, 73). Even though
the defendants had never been personally advised that
the deal was off (Tr. 96), in the Spring of 1970 they noticed that Hulets had listed the property for sale with a
real estate agent who had placed an advertisement in one
of the local papers (Tr. 96-97). This was the first time
defendants suspected that the transaction might not go
through (Tr. 96, 98). On June 23, 1970, plaintiff had the ~
Iron County Sheriff serve Notice to Quit upon defendants
(Tr. 10), said Notice being marked Exhibit P-2. Defendants refused to vacate the premises (Tr. 9) and SummollS
was served on Defendants in July of 1970.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESTITUTION TO PLAINTIFF AND BY NOT DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ON THE ORAL
CONTRACT DUE TO THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF DEFENDANTS.

It is a general rule that the statute of frauds requires

a writing for the enforceability of any contract to create
or transfer any interest in land. Simpson on Contracts,
2nd Ed., sec. 77, p. 153. The Utah Legisl~ture codified
this general rule in Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which provides, in part, "No estate or interest in
real property ... shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of la:w, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same ... '' However, it is further a general
rnle that courts will decree specific performance of an
oral land contract, despite the statute of frauds, where
there has been substantial part performance in reliance
on the oral contract, said performance to be referable to
the oral contract, and providing the remedy of claimant
for the Yalne of his part performance is inadequate so
that to d<>.ny enforcement would be to work ~ fraud on
the partv performing. 8impsnn, snpra, sec. 79, page 157.
'rhr Utah L<>.gislature has adopted a provision allowing
thP rmirts to adopt, and enfore<>. this general exception

8
to the statute of frauds. Section 25-5-8 of Utah

('1J1/!'

An-

notated, 1953, provides that "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to com- '
pel the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.''
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has adopted ·
the doctrine of part performance as an exception to the
statute of frauds. Brinton v. Van Cott, Utah 1893, 8 Ut.
480, 33 P. 218, and Price v. Lloyd, Utah 1906,

:n Ft.

86,

86 P. 767. In the Price case at page 770, the Court adopted and restated Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Con-

tracts, saying:
''When a verbal contract has been made, and one
party has knowingly aided or permitted the other
to go on and do acts in part performance of the •
agreement, acts done in fnll ~eliance upon such
agreement as a valid and binding contract, and
which would not have been done without the ag-reement, and which are of such a natnre as to chanQ'r
the relation of the parties, and to prevent a re'toration to their former condition and l:Pl adequate '
compensation for th<' ]oss hv a ]ega] jndg-ment for
damages, then it wou1<l h<' a virtual frand in thr
first party to interpose the statute of frarnfa as a
bar to a completion of the contract. ann thns to
secure for hims(l]f all the hf'n(lfit of the artR alreadv done in part performance. '"hil(l the othrr
partv. would not onlv lose all advanta tr<' f rom ~c
bargain, hnt would he left without acl<'mrnte rem·h11t hr
.
f
po~· for his failnr(l or comrwnsa t 10n or "

had done in pursuance of it. To prevent the success
of such a palpable fraud, equity interposes under
these circumstances, and compels an entire comyiletion of the contract by decreeing its specific
execution.''
The Court in Pria wrnt on to state, at pag;e 771:

''It mm;t appear that the improvements. relied

upon as part performance, are of a character permanently beneficial to the land and involving a
sacrifice to him who made them beeause and in rPliance of the gift.''
Further, the Court stated, at page 772:
"Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine
(of part performance) have not, by any means,
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only
to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a fraud. In order that a plaintiff be permitted
to give evidenee of a contract not in writirn:i;, and
which is in the verv teeth of the statute and a
nullity at law, it is essential that he establish, bv
el ear and pOf;itive -proof, acts and thino;s done in
pursuance and on account thereof. exclnsivelv referable thereto, and which take it ont of the operation of the Rtatnte." (Parenthesis mine.)
The Prire r. TAnwl ease was cited nnmerons times bv
thr Court in H nrnrpn1·ps 1·.

R11rtnri.

Utah 1922. 5~ Ut. 57fi.

20() P. 2G2. ;:tR h0irn2.· the ontstanding case in Utah pertain-

inr.· to th0 (lodrinP of partial nerformance.

10
In the east• i11 rr, Jfru/:.;c11 's /~'stat,, rl·t.c·tli I'')-'
,);,,

·~.-) .

;>,

2d .J!J.) at page (iOl, the l'tah ( 011rt stat Pd:
1

"Part performane<> 'd1ieh will ~ffoi<l :c:tatnt(' of
fnn~ds 1:11'ay. eonsist of an;- aet whieh P11ts party
performmg- Ill sneli position that nonpPrformanrr
h;- other wonlcl eonsti1nt<> fra11(1."
In another ease dPaling- witl1 n:irt pPrfonnnnrf'. tlw
rtah Court stated:

"Jt is to he notP(l that possession hY thP

p}::~intiff

is rep:arded as an important fad, on<' whirh is g-enerall;- directl:- reforahle to the contract, and '\'hen
combined with 1wrmanent and Yaluahle improwments whieh are n•presentatiYe 0f the existenrr of
an oral contraet. Yirtnalh- eYerY jnrisdirtion will
grant spef'ifie performance." Ra1·ariwJ 1·. Prirr,
Utah 1%B, 2GO P. 2c1 ;)70, at pag-P G79.

In Rarari110, at pag-P G79, the Court statPil that wherP
possession is reliPcl 1111011 "it must hP of such natnre that
it would not haYP hePn l!:iYPn without the prpspnce of an
oral rontract to com'e>-· '' For other Ptah cas0s whrrein
the Ptah Court affirm0d thP floetrillC' of nart perfor·
manee

SC'C

rrtal! Merc11r (ir:ld Millillrt ('o ..

l'f

(/1.,

I'.

Her·

stlid Gold Mi11i11q r'o., rt (/l .. Utah Hl4B, B4 P. 2d 1094.
J,eGrand Johnso11 C'orpornfim1 r. Peff'r.•w11, l'f (ll.,

1071, 2G Ptah 2fl 1G8, 48fi P.

2c1

1040,

aml

Utah

Ho_qn11 ,.

Fi1l'mp:r', et al .. TTtah 1!12;), ()?) lTt. ::!80, 2::!7 P 1097, whrrr

th0 Co11rt lwhl that wlwr0 th0 y0nrl00 achrnlh- occnnie<l

8

portion nf l:11Hl m·1l:in°· s11h"tan+inl imnroY0m0nts thrrron.

11
he was entitled to specific performance of oral contract

'

the facts justifying an exception to the statute of frauds.
Bee also 8 i illpsou, supra, Sec. 79.

The Utah Court has dealt with the sufficiency and
types of acts which will satisfy the exception of part performance. In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company,
Utah 1%6, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480, at page 484, the
Court outlined three general criteria in removing an oral
contract from the Statute, they being:
''First, the oral contract and its terms must be
clear and definite; second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and
definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance on
the contract.''

In the case of Latses, et al., 1·. Nick Flnor, Inc., Utah 1940,
104 P. 2d 619, the Court held that improvements made
upon premises may take a contract relating to such premises out of the statute of frauds even to the extent of requiring a conveyance of the premises pursuant to an oral
agreement. The improvements made in the Latses case
were cement work, repairing; floors, repairing; the stairs,
repairing the toilets and plumbing, painting, paneling,
repairing; the electric wiring and placing a floor ventilator in the premises. The Court considered these improvementR to he permanent. ThP Co11rt in Lafsr',s state<l:
"The defense of the statute of frauds mav not be
irnrrl as n m0m1s of (lpfra11ding- a party to a ron-

12
tract. If he has iwrformcu his side of the ag-reoment, the• other party may not accept the benefits
of that performance and c1011~- the liabilities; but ,
this presupposes that he who accepts thoHe benefits
has actual or constructin.• knowledge of their existance. '' Pag·e G23.
Tlw Court nlso stated on paµ:e 622 that the improvements •
mlrnt he ''something more than repairs that a tenant from
month to month might make simply for his own convenience."
Simpson, supra, sec. 78, p. 158, indicates possession
coupled with valuable and permanent improvements is
ronsi(lcred the strongest and most unequivocal act of part
performance.
The theory of the doctrine of part performance is
hasecl upon the premise that it would be a fraud upon the
Yendee if the vendor were permitted to escape the perfor·
manc0 of his part of the oral agreement after he has permitte<l the Yenc10e to perform in reliance upon the oral '
agreement. 4!1 A m.l11r, Statute of Frauds, sec. 421, pages
72:J-G. ri'his Hection further provides:
''The oral rontract is enforced in harmony with the
principal that eonrt::-; of equity will not allow th~
stat11t0 of frands to h(' used as an instrument 0
frall<l. Tn other worclR, th0 doctrine of part perfor·
rnmw<> wn~ 0stnhlished for the samr pnrpOf;e for

13
which the statute of frauds itself was enacted
. of fraud, and arose'
namely, for the prevent10n
from the necessity of preventing the statute from
becoming an agent of fraud, for it could not have
been the intention of the statute'to enable any party to commit a fraud with impunity." (Pages
725-6).
See also 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of, sec. 248, p. 755.
To summarize, there are six elements which should
be discussed regarding the doctrine of part performance.
First, the acts relied upon must be such as to
change the vendee 's position, resulting in fraud,
injustice or hardship if the contract is not enforced.
49 .AmJur, Statute of Frauds, sec. 427, p. 734. Second,
the part performance must be prejudicial to the performing party placing him in a situation which will not result
in compensation and which situation he would have avoided had there been no contract. 49 .AmJur, supra, p. 734.
Third, the act of the vendee must ref er solely to the contract and be substantial, 49 .AmJur supra p. 734.
Fourth, there need not (emphasis mine) be payment by
vendee where it appears that he had a good reason for
not making said payment. 49 .AmJur, supra, sec. 435, p.
741. Fifth, though there need not be possession of the
premises in question by the vendee, possession coupled
with valuable improvements is said to be the strong-est

14

act of part performance by which an oral contract to sell
land is taken out of the statute of frauds. 49 AmJur, supra, sec. 449, p. 755-6. Sixth, in order to constitute part
performance, the improvements must be made with the
knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the vendor. 49
Am.Ju.r, supra, sec. 451, p. 758.

The facts indicate that on July 24, 1969, plaintiff
and/or his wife told the defendants that they would sell
to them the house, lot, and 42 shares of water stock for
$5,000.00 to be paid by $200.00 down payment and $100.00 .
a month to an escrow trustee. Further, the defendants
made vast improvements expending a considerable
amount of money on the premises from August, 1969 to
November, 1969, in reliance on this contract. Defendants
moved into the premises, even though they had not signed
a contract, on the assurance of plaintiff and his wife.
Defendants would not have expended the labor and money
on the premises had it not been for the fact that plaintiff
and/or his wife told them to move in and do as they
wished (Tr. 68, 84). It is clear from the testimony (Tr.
16-23, 37-38, 43-44, 50, 89, 116) that the parties herein had

a "meeting of the mir.ds" as to every aspect of the alleged contract. In fact, all testimony by plaintiff, his wife,
and the defendants was to the effect that Exhibit D-1
was what thev had agreed npon orally, excepting a pro·
vision for th.e wat<"r and for the escrow arrangement
which was to hC' sPt np. Further, fill the tPstimonv in<li·

15
cates that tlie contract obtained by defendants, Exhibit
D-2, was a true reflection of their deal but that Hulets
would not execute it because of the particular attorney
who drafted the agreement. There was testimony by defendants that they were already living in an apartment
which was in better condition than these specific premises
for a rental of $40.00 per month (Tr. 63). It doesn't
seem likely that they would have moved into these premises on a rental arrangement where thne was a need for
vast improvements when they were already living under
better conditions.
Appellants submit that the facts of this case fall
within, and are governed by, the preceding case law
which this Honorable Court has handed down. There is
no question but that the acts of defendants were performed in reliance upon a clear and definite oral contract. See Randall, supra. Further, there is n0 question
but that the labor and improvements of defendants were
permanent, valuable and sufficient to brinq; this particular case within the exception of partial performance.
Ree Lasesc, supra.
Each and every requisite or element of the part performance doctrine has been satisfied. First, defendants'
acts definitely changed their position which will result
in fraud and injustice if the oral contract is not enforced.
RPco11rl. tl1P defondants arE' placed in a situation where

16
there can be no adequate compensation other than specific performance and, also, they arc in a situation which
definitely would have been avoided had there been no con- •
tract. Third, the acts of defendants were brought about
by, and ref er solely to, the oral contract. Fourth. there
is sufficient evidence that defendants were readv willin~

.'

~

and able to make the down payment but that they were •
completely ignored by plaintiff and his wife, even though
payment is not a requirement under the part performance
doctrine. Fifth, defendants were in possession of the
premises and still are, said possession being coupled with •
the substantial and valuable improvements made by them
and resulting in the strongest and most unequivocal act
of part performance. Sixth, there is no question but that
the plaintiff and his wife had constructive, if not actual,
knowledge of the vast improvements in that there were •
several phone conversations (Tr. 107) between the parties
and that the plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that
he drove by the premises four times daily in the romse
of1 his employment (Tr. 11).
CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully suhmit that they are clearly
entitled to have specific performance decreed of that oral ~
contract made with plaintiff and his wifo on .J11ly 24.
1969, due to their substantial actions and performance
in rPliance thereof, and that it won kl he a franrl :Hrain>l

17
)Wiem to allow plaintiff to act contrary to the oral con~ract. This matter should therefore be remanded back
to the District Court with appropriate instructions.

Respectfully submitted,

CLINE,

JACKSON & JACKSON,

By LeRay G. Jackson
.Attorney for .A.ppeZloots

